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List of lessons learned from Iraq invasion, recommended at least skimming through it.
First and foremost it talks about how mechnized units are 100% leeter and why the Army made it into Baghdad while the mostly motorized Marines got pinned down.
The purpose of such maneuvers is to generate uncertainty in the mind of the opponent. Surprise may result from technology, but the actual surprise is not in the weapon system; it is in the mind of the commander and staff that surprise really takes place. Military commanders, not weapons systems, are surprised.
It’s probably worth repeating that: Surprise is an event that takes place in the mind of an enemy commander.
http://www.jerrypournelle.com/sot/sot_5.htm
This is an excerp of a truly wonderful book written by a group of military science proffessors on the nature of technology and warfare called the Strategy of Technology. The entire book is availlable online and I would highly recomend it
On the T-64: "The turret space was so cramped that the autoloader would occasionally latch onto a crewmember and hurl him into the breach creating new sopranos for the red army choir" (and yes that is verbatim.)